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ON NOT BEING “NOT AN ORIGINALIST” 
H. JEFFERSON POWELL 
This semester I am teaching constitutional law out of a new casebook—
new to me and to the world at large (it came out just in time for the 
semester)—and a very fine casebook it is.1 One of its most prominent 
features is its recurrent use of a distinction between originalist and not-
originalist as a tool for the students, a means of identifying arguments and 
classifying decisions. Unavoidably, therefore, in teaching out of the 
casebook I find myself obliged to talk about originalism and its supposed 
opposite, and inadvertently I suppose I end up suggesting from time to time 
that I am, or that I am not, an originalist myself.  
And that is frustrating. It is no doubt true that classifying the positions 
that constitutionalists take is sometimes appropriate, a necessary part of the 
ongoing debate over whether a given decision is persuasive, or on what 
basis a given scholar argues for her approach to deciding constitutional 
cases. But such classifications can be misleading. I am told from time to 
time that I am “not an originalist”—and that seems wrong to me. Not 
because I am what today we call an originalist, but because I am not the 
opposite either. The distinction between originalism and its negation, on 
which my very fine casebook is built and which animates a great deal of 
modern constitutional scholarship, is—I think—misleading. I am neither an 
originalist nor “not an originalist,” and in my view you too should avoid 
being either. This evening I want to explore why that is so. 
I. 
Let us begin a long time ago, long before the story of American 
constitutional originalism begins, with Alain of Lille, a French poet and 
theologian who died in 1202 and who came to be known later as the doctor 
universalis because of his broad-ranging interests.2 Alain worked roughly 
 
 1. See GREGORY E. MAGGS & PETER J. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH (2009). 
 2. Perhaps Alain’s chief claim to attention from modern scholars has been in his role as a 
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halfway between the eleventh century renaissance of learning in the Latin 
Christian West and the rise of high-medieval scholasticism. In a few 
decades, the translation into Latin of Aristotle and his great Muslim and 
Jewish interpreters that was going on during Alain’s lifetime would inspire 
the remarkable creativity of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas and, 
shortly after that, the path-breaking inquiries of the great Franciscan natural 
scientists of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Alain does not get 
great press from modern scholars for his place in this trajectory. I wonder if 
that is not a little unfair. He was less talented no doubt but perhaps he was 
also a little overwhelmed by the intellectual challenges posed by all the new 
sources and ways of thought.3 My interest in him tonight is with a book he 
wrote not long before he died. Alain intended the book, known as On the 
Catholic Faith, as a refutation of the “new heretics” whom he believed to be 
devising novel errors even while pretending to rely on the recognized 
authorities of the past. The problem of error and authority was not new: 
Abelard had identified it decades earlier in his controversial book Yes and 
No, where he sought to demonstrate the profound theological disagreements 
to be found among the Church Fathers.4 Alain and his contemporaries were 
increasingly troubled over how to accommodate Plato and Aristotle, with 
their enormous prestige as the great sages of antiquity, in an intellectual 
world already confused about how to reconcile its own internal authorities, 
its sources of argument in Scripture, canon law, and church doctrine. 
To his great credit, Alain saw that merely to cite or quote authority was 
no answer to these difficulties. Different scholars can cite the same 
authorities for contrary propositions, and for that reason argument based on 
authority (the argumentum ab auctoritate) is often unsatisfactory either for 
disputation or in seeking to address one’s own questions.5 In making this 
point Alain crafted one of those sentences that, freed from its literary and 
historical contexts, is echoed again and again in later thought because it 
captures a truth that is enduring. “But since authority has a nose made of 
wax, it is possible to twist it in any direction, so that one must rely on 
 
source for and influence on Chaucer. See, e.g., Sarah Powrie, Alan of Lille’s Anticlaudianus as 
Intertext in Chaucer’s House of Fame, 44 CHAUCER REV. 246 (2010). 
 3. See the mixed evaluation of Alain’s success by G.R. Evans in her generally sympathetic 
study of his work, G.R. EVANS, ALAN OF LILLE: THE FRONTIERS OF THEOLOGY IN THE LATER 
TWELFTH CENTURY 168 (1983) (“He had flair, but not brilliance, persistence, but not depth, a 
taste for novelty, but no real originality.”). Eileen C. Sweeney’s recent, remarkable book 
persuasively argues that this common judgment greatly understates Alain’s insight and creativity. 
See EILEEN SWEENEY, LOGIC, THEOLOGY, AND POETRY IN BOETHIUS, ABELARD, AND ALAN OF 
LILLE: WORDS IN THE ABSENCE OF THINGS 127–75, 181–83 (2006).  
 4. See DAVID KNOWLES, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT 125–26 (1962) 
(discussing Abelard’s purpose in employing as a method “the juxtaposition of seemingly 
contradictory authorities”).  
 5. On Alain’s place in the twelfth and thirteenth century debate over how to relate 
arguments from authority to arguments based on reason, see EVANS, supra note 3, at 129–32. 
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strengthening the rational faculty.”6 Just why later medievals found Alain’s 
image of the “wax nose” quite so powerful I cannot tell you, but his point is 
clear enough: what line of argument a complex or ambiguous authority 
supports depends on how one interprets that authority, and interpretation 
itself can go, at least much of the time, in more than one direction. The 
lament or complaint that Scripture in particular has a wax nose—that 
arguments invoking the incontestable authority of the Bible can very often 
be mounted on either side of a proposition—became commonplace in 
medieval theology after Alain.7 
Alain’s image played a significant role in the great theological disputes 
of the sixteenth century.8 Responding to the argument that the complexities 
of scriptural interpretation made obedience to the teaching authority of the 
Church a necessity for Christians, the great Reformers insisted on the 
perspicuity of Scripture, its clearness taken as a whole and on all important 
matters. In 1525, Luther stated this view with his typical vigor:  
that in Scripture there are some things abstruse, and everything is 
not plain—this is an idea put about by the ungodly Sophists . . . . 
The subject matter of the Scriptures . . . is all quite accessible, even 
though some texts are still obscure owing to our ignorance of their 
terms . . . [but] if the words are obscure in one place, yet they are 
plain in another.9  
Luther often invoked Alain’s figure of speech, but he recast its 
meaning. The problem created by the conflicting arguments of biblical 
exegetes was for Luther a real one, but its source lay not in the difficulties 
of interpretation but in the wickedness of the interpreters. Scripture’s wax 
nose was the product of the perverse ingenuity of theologians and hierarchs 
intent on twisting the Bible’s clear meaning to support their own fancies 
and power.10 The solution was not recourse to papal authority but a faithful 
approach to interpreting the Bible that would of itself dissolve the conflicts.  
The problem for which Alain provided a commonly-used metaphor has 
later echoes in many areas. Luther’s hotly-contested diagnosis, that the 
pretensions of institutional power are easily served by the supposed 
 
 6. Alain de Lille, De fide catholica contra haereticos 1.30: “Sed quia auctoritas cereum 
habet nasum, id est in diversum potest flecti sensum, rationibus roborandum est.” Alain’s image 
became, Jean-Louis Quantain suggests, a “scholastic joke.” See JEAN-LOUIS QUANTAIN, THE 
CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITY 83 n.334 (2009). 
 7. See QUANTAIN, supra note 6. 
 8. See, e.g., H.C. Porter, The Nose of Wax: Scripture and the Spirit from Erasmus to Milton, 
14 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 155 (1964). 
 9. MARTIN LUTHER, The Bondage of the Will (1526), in 33 LUTHER’S WORKS 25, 26 
(Philip S. Watson ed., 1972). 
 10. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER, Against the Papacy in Rome, Against the Most Celebrated 
Romanist in Leipzig (1520), in 39 LUTHER’S WORKS 81 (Eric W. Gritsch ed., 1970) (“Thus we 
see how excellently the Romanists deal with Scripture, making whatever they want of it, as if it 
were a wax nose to be pulled to and fro.”).  
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difficulties of interpretation, has also enjoyed an ongoing currency. In that 
regard, and coming closer both to our time and to my eventual subject, the 
pre-1787 history of Anglo-American law is replete with statements of 
anxiety over the pliability of legal authority and the uncertainties attending 
its interpretation, often expressed as a concern over the claims of others to 
interpretive power. Let me quote a couple of familiar examples: responding 
to Sir Edward Coke’s assertion that the law can only be interpreted through 
the “artificial reason” of the common lawyers, King James I snapped that 
“[i]f the Judges interprete the lawes themselves and suffer none else to 
interprete, then they may easily make of the laws shipmens hose.”11 Almost 
a century later, Bishop Benjamin Hoadly failed to mention either wax noses 
or sailors’ stockings but made the same claim: “Whoever hath an absolute 
authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the 
Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or 
spoke them.”12 And just to prove that I have not entirely forgotten my topic, 
consider this exchange, shortly after the Philadelphia convention adjourned, 
between Gouverneur Morris and a friend. Morris, you will recall, was more 
than anyone else the final, individual draftsman of the 1787 Constitution, 
and he later wrote that he “believed it to be as clear as our language would 
permit.”13 Nevertheless, Morris responded to praise of his handiwork very 
much in the spirit of Alain of Lille. “Friend to Morris: ‘You have given us a 
good Constitution.’ Morris: ‘That depends on how it is construed.’”14 
Common lawyers (and their critics) have always recognized the truth in 
Alain’s worry that it is possible to twist authority in diverse directions and 
to differing and contrary ends.  
Authority, including the Constitution as an authority, has or may have a 
wax nose; interpretation may make of it something as flexible and 
unconstraining as a sock. Alain was right to be worried, and his worry 
should trouble anyone who works within or is committed to a system of 
normative thought (such as Christian theology or American constitutional 
law) that rests on written authorities. In the sentence I quoted you a few 
minutes ago, Alain also suggested a solution, at least in part, to his worry, 
and I will return to him and to his solution at the end of this lecture. For 
 
 11. See HOWARD NENNER, BY COLOUR OF LAW: LEGAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS IN ENGLAND, 1660–1689, at 72 (1977). 
 12. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 102 n.2 (1921). 
 13. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 420 (M. Farrand ed., 1966). 
 14. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 228 (1938). Thomas Jefferson, in 
fact, used Alain’s metaphor, halfway at any rate. See Letter from Jefferson to Spencer Roane 
(Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140, 141 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
1899) (“The Constitution, on this hypothesis [that the power to interpret the Constitution is 
exclusively judicial], is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist 
and shape into any form they please.”). 
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now, however, let me turn at last to originalism, widely touted as the proper 
means of addressing the malleability of the Constitution’s wax nose.  
We can profitably start by setting out a few historical propositions 
about American constitutional law that I think are incontrovertible although 
I am not confident that they are always given their full weight. First, 
lawyers have been making arguments about the original meaning of the 
Constitution ever since there was a Constitution to have a meaning, and 
they have made those arguments in every form known to lawyers in 2009—
save, to be sure, the thousand footnote article.15 
I’ll give one example, in fact one of the earliest: in his 1791 opinion on 
the constitutionality of a national bank, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson 
based his conclusion in part on the proceedings of the Philadelphia framers. 
“It is known that the [power to charter corporations],” Jefferson wrote, “was 
rejected . . . by the Convention which formed the Constitution,” and for that 
reason among others he advised President Washington that the power did 
not exist.16 Arguments from original meaning are, well, unoriginal. 
Second historical proposition: ever since the Constitution became law, 
American constitutional lawyers have been attacking original meaning 
arguments as inconclusive, unpersuasive, or even immaterial because some 
other consideration outweighed them. Again, I will use an example from the 
1791 bank debate. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton (himself, 
you will recall, a framer), told President Washington that Jefferson was 
wrong on all points, including Jefferson’s reference to the Philadelphia 
convention, over which Washington of course had presided. Hamilton 
criticized Jefferson’s sources—“the precise nature or extent of this 
proposition [to include an express incorporation power and] the reasons for 
refusing it [are] not ascertained by any authentic document, or even by 
accurate recollection.”17 He rejected Jefferson’s interpretation of what had 
happened as an historically erroneous over-simplification of what had gone 
on in Philadelphia. Finally, and most radically, Hamilton simply dismissed 
Jefferson’s original-meaning argument as beside the point in light of other, 
 
 15. Of course early lawyers lacked the amazing resources we now have at our fingertips and 
so their original meaning arguments were mostly a lot briefer than ours tend to be—one of the 
ironies of our constitutional history is that any competent modern scholar knows far more about 
the details of the founding generation’s arguments over the document’s meaning than any founder 
ever did or could have, and that includes James Madison.  
 16. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National 
Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER 43 (1991) (“A 
proposition was made to them to authorize Congress to open canals, and an amendatory one to 
empower them to incorporate. But the whole was rejected, and one of the reasons for rejection 
urged in debate was that then they would have a power to erect a bank, which would render the 
great cities, where there were prejudices and jealousies on the subject, adverse to the reception of 
the Constitution.”).  
 17. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), 
reprinted in POWELL, supra note 16, at 48. 
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and to Hamilton more persuasive, arguments not based on original 
meaning:  
whatever may have been the intention of the framers of a 
constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the 
instrument itself, according to the usual & established rules of 
construction. Nothing is more common than for laws to express and 
effect more or less than was intended.18  
As Jefferson and Hamilton are witnesses, throughout our history, 
lawyers have made, and rebutted, original-meaning arguments in specific 
situations, sometimes sounding as if original meaning were all that mattered 
(when that would buttress their position), and sometimes sounding as if 
original-meaning arguments were entirely illegitimate (again, when that 
was the helpful viewpoint). Such comments, even when made by judges in 
opinions, were advocacy and should not be read as anything more. There 
has never been a time in which arguments from original meaning were 
universally or invariably treated as conclusive on the question of 
constitutional meaning, any more than there has been a time in which such 
arguments have been universally disparaged. 
Third historical proposition: no one gave much attention until very 
recently to the possible variations among the forms of what I am calling 
original meaning argument, or to the possible differences in legitimacy or 
persuasiveness between these variations. Any contemporary originalist 
worth her salt can explain the serious practical and theoretical differences 
between, say, the claim that the Constitution means X because the 
Philadelphia framers intended X and the claim that it means X because that 
is what an ideal reader at the time it was written would have taken it to 
mean. Contemporary originalists parse these distinctions with great care 
and debate their significance with tremendous sophistication. But as an 
historical matter, and this is my historical point, the distinctions, the debate, 
and the sophistication are all novelties, created within the professional 
memory of lawyers my age. They were not an important feature of 
traditional constitutional argument.  
Do not misunderstand me. From the beginning, lawyers making 
constitutional arguments have invoked the familiar building blocks of 
originalist debate—“the framers,” “the ratifiers,” “the Convention” (or 
conventions), intent and intention and meaning and purpose. Some of the 
phrases do not show up quite as often, perhaps, as some people seem to 
think they should, but the language is there. The resemblance between these 
traditional expressions, however, and the modern debate is superficial. Let 
us take Chief Justice John Marshall as a representative of early 
constitutional usage. Is it the purposes and intentions of the framers and 
 
 18. Id. 
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ratifiers that matter? “[T]he great duty of a judge who construes an 
instrument, is to find the intention of its makers”; “the intention is the most 
sacred rule of interpretation.”19 Or perhaps it is the words of the 
Constitution alone that govern: “[We] know of no rule for construing [the 
Constitution] other than is given by the language of the instrument”; “this 
court does not feel itself authorised to disregard the plain meaning of words, 
in search of a conjectural intent to which we are not conducted by the 
language of any part of the instrument” regardless of the historical evidence 
about such a “particular intent.”20 Or is it his point that the best evidence of 
intent and purpose is the text: “the enlightened patriots who framed our 
Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood . . . to have 
intended what they have said.”21 In the end, one comes away from reading 
Marshall with the sense that there was usually very little difference in his 
mind between talking about the intentions and purposes of the framers and 
ratifiers, the meaning understood by the people, and his own construction of 
the words through the exercise of reason and principle. In this Marshall 
was, I suggest, thoroughly conventional, for his day and after. Traditionally 
lawyers have talked, when they thought it helpful, about what the framers 
intended and what the Constitution’s original purposes were and so on, but 
on the whole they have done so unselfconsciously, haphazardly. Most of the 
time such language was clearly nothing but an emphatic way of saying that 
such and such is what the Constitution really means.  
This is not to say that one cannot find genuine original-meaning 
arguments, but they are simply one mode of argument among many, 
without any special importance or receiving any special attention. Take 
Marshall again, as an example. In Barron v. Baltimore, Marshall considered 
the claim that the protections of the Fifth Amendment apply to state 
governmental action because its language does not limit its scope to the 
federal government. Writing for the Court, Marshall loftily announced that 
the original purpose of the amendment, as revealed in “the history of the 
day,” made it necessary to limit the application of the amendment’s words. 
Original meaning was determinative.22 In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 
on the other hand, the Chief Justice refused to confine the protections of the 
contracts clause of Article I, Section 10 to private contracts even though he 
conceded that “it was not particularly in the view of the framers” to apply 
its words to a public charter such as that before the Court. When arguments 
based on other considerations are persuasive, Marshall wrote, “it is not 
 
 19. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 2, 1819, 
reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 167, 168–69 (G. 
Gunther ed., 1969). 
 20. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824); Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 
410, 434 (1830). 
 21. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 188. 
 22. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). 
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enough to say, that this particular case was not in the mind of the 
convention, when the [constitutional provision] was framed, nor of the 
American people, when it was adopted.”23 Original meaning was not 
determinative. Attempts to find an underlying originalist logic to what 
Marshall wrote in the two cases are, I believe, pointless, but so is the 
suggestion that he was contradicting himself in any serious fashion. Like 
the vast majority of American constitutionalists for most of our history, 
Marshall did not think there was any general principle to be followed on the 
use or rejection of original-meaning argument. There were simply particular 
arguments, persuasive or not in the context of particular cases. 
As I remarked earlier, I think these are simple and rather 
uncontroversial claims about the history of constitutional argument. Their 
importance for my topic today lies in their essential irrelevance for much of 
the contemporary debate over what we call “originalism.” Despite all the 
discussion of the past that this debate includes, it is not really about 
history.24 The argument over originalism is a debate over a question of law. 
It is bootless to argue over whether originalism is constitutionally 
normative by invoking claims, even warranted claims, about the past. 
Gouverneur Morris once wrote, quizzically, “But, my dear Sir, what can a 
history of the Constitution avail towards interpreting its provisions? This 
must be done by comparing the plain import of the words, with the general 
tenor and object of the instrument.”25 Suppose you and I conclude that as an 
historical matter, Morris was expressing the general understanding of the 
founding generation: would that disprove originalism’s claim to being the 
proper legal approach? I think not, and not just because of the obvious 
problem of circularity but more fundamentally because to answer otherwise 
is to commit a category error. Law is law, not history. 
Some of you are thinking, I am fairly sure, that this is too simple: 
perhaps the proper legal question defines its answer in terms of historical 
assertions, in which case history can speak to law. I agree, but in that case 
we need to identify the legal principle that gives history legal weight. What 
might that principle be? 
 
 23. 17 U.S. (14 Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819). 
 24. The reason that the historical attempts to resolve the originalism debate are endless is that 
history on its own cannot settle legal disputes, any more than law can settle historical ones. Turn 
the process around if you are in doubt: it’s a legitimate question whether Parliament’s attempts to 
assert legislative jurisdiction over the North American colonies were the central factor in 
triggering the American Revolution or an excuse for actions that the colonists would have taken 
eventually anyway. You will get nowhere in answering it, however, by presenting an argument, 
regardless of how powerful, that Parliament lacked the constitutional authority: your legal 
argument may be persuasive but it fails to join issue with the historical inquiry.  
 25. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, supra note 13. 
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II. 
In order to answer this last question, it is time to bring onto center stage 
our central character, as yet noticeable by its absence. What is originalism? 
The term itself is, I think, not all that old: many people say that it was 
coined by the distinguished scholar Paul Brest in a 1980 article.26 That may 
well be right; in any event, what we mean when we talk about originalism is 
a proposition of constitutional law, or more exactly constitutional theory, 
that was the product, I think, of specific issues in the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s. 
Let me remind you briefly of the state of constitutional law at about the 
time Professor Brest wrote his article. The Warren Court had given way to 
the Burger Court, a fairly consistent judicial liberalism apparently driven by 
substantive political commitments to a fairly rootless and inconsistent 
assertion of judicial power.27 
The Court and the constitutional law that it administers were under 
attack from all directions, and perhaps most damningly from observers such 
as Alexander Bickel and John Hart Ely who seemed unhappy not with the 
Court’s outcomes in themselves but with the coherence and intellectual 
honesty of the arguments that justices and lawyers were entertaining: 
writing about Roe v. Wade, for example, Professor Ely famously asserted 
that the decision was “bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather 
because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an 
obligation to try to be.”28 The Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, it 
seemed to many people, had simply collapsed into an illegitimate form of 
politics, with the Constitution and its wax nose serving as an excuse for the 
adoption of their policy preferences by nine (or indeed five out of nine) 
politicians wearing black robes. I think the alarm the critics felt was 
somewhat exaggerated—much of the course of constitutional law between 
the mid-Fifties and the mid-Seventies seems to me perfectly defensible. But 
there were problems, and serious ones, in what the Court and some of its 
more supportive observers were willing to count as conscientious decision 
making.  
Take as an example, the Court’s 1972 decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
which extended the constitutional right to receive contraceptives to 
unmarried persons.29 In its first contraception decision a few years earlier, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the opinion of the Court appeared to ground the 
 
 26. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 204 n.1 (1980). 
 27. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term—Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 13, 76 (1995).  
 28. John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 
947 (1973). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS (1970). 
 29. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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constitutional right of a married couple to use contraceptives in the special 
nature of the marriage relationship, “an association,” the Court announced, 
“for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions” protecting 
the freedom of association.30 In Eisenstadt, the entirety of the Court’s 
explanation for applying Griswold’s right of marital privacy to the 
unmarried was as follows: “if the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted 
governmental intrusion.”31 Now there are a great many things that can be 
said about Griswold and Eisenstadt and the constitutional right to receive or 
use contraceptives, but one thing that cannot be said—with a straight face 
and expecting to be taken seriously—is that if the right of marital privacy 
announced in Griswold means “anything,” it must be a right belonging to 
individuals regardless of marital status. The Court’s assertion that the 
Constitution requires that conclusion was proof that the difference between 
reasoned judgment and authoritarian diktat had become obscure.  
Originalism was born in response to a situation in which the 
Constitution’s most important interpreters could present the “logic” of the 
Eisenstadt opinion as though it were a reasonable legal argument. The core 
problem of which Eisenstadt was a symptom was not in truth the existence 
of doubt whether the Court decided the case correctly: such doubts have 
been with us always. The problem, rather, lay in the Court’s cavalier 
attitude toward the opinion filed supposedly in justification of its decision. 
As Professor Ely wrote about Roe, the Eisenstadt opinion failed to be 
reasoned constitutional law and gave almost no sense of an obligation to be 
so. The justices who joined the opinion cannot have taken its one-sentence 
non sequitur seriously as providing a defensible legal rationale for the 
holding. In acting as if it did, they revealed a sort of contempt for the notion 
of reasoned decision, and for the litigants, lawyers, and general public for 
whom the opinion was supposed to explain the Court’s decision. If the 
Eisenstadt opinion discharges the Court’s duty to explain itself, that duty is 
a sheer formality, an empty ritual. It is understandable that lamentable 
judicial performances such as that in Eisenstadt would provoke a sharp 
reaction. 
Originalism was that reaction.32 Reduced to a sentence, and leaving to 
one side later refinements, here it is: the legal interpretation of the 
Constitution ought to be governed by what we can make out about its 
 
 30. 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). 
 31. 405 U.S. at 453.  
 32. We do not need to stop now to consider the extent to which the early proponents of 
originalism were motivated by professional and intellectual dissatisfaction with the Supreme 
Court’s failures as opposed to the expediencies of argument: the true answers, I suppose, would be 
just as mixed as they would be if we asked the same question of the early opponents of 
originalism, and would differ among individuals. My interest is not in anyone’s motivations but in 
the proposal.  
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original meaning. This does not mean, and no responsible originalist has 
ever claimed, that the Supreme Court can never entertain any other 
considerations (stare decisis, for example) in deciding a constitutional case. 
But originalism, in the significant sense that the term is used in current 
debate, is the proposal that properly constructed original-meaning 
arguments have a priority over all other forms of constitutional argument, 
that at least presumptively and ordinarily an original-meaning argument 
persuasive in its own terms (“oh yeah, that must be what the commerce 
clause originally meant!”) defeats other claims about constitutional 
interpretation. The meaning of the Constitution’s spare language, which 
history confirms can indeed be twisted in various directions, is to be fixed 
by an interpretive lodestar located in the past, beyond the reach of present-
day preferences. Contemporary originalists have worked this out in far 
greater detail and with much greater care than you can find in the first 
originalist arguments thirty years ago, but the core of the proposal remains 
the same.33 The answer to what appears to be a purely historical question—
what did this bit of writing mean when it was first crafted?—thus becomes 
the answer to the legal question of the Constitution’s present-day meaning. 
Originalism is, in a very real sense, an enormously attractive proposal. 
The problem it was crafted to address was, and is, no laughing matter. If in 
truth the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions are authoritative simply 
and only because they are the Court’s, with the Constitution serving merely 
as the window dressing for the Court’s choices, then we are in the 
predicament Alain of Lille identified long ago. Our central legal authority, 
the Constitution, turns out to have a wax nose that can be twisted in 
whatever direction a majority of the justices prefer: as President Lincoln 
wrote in a somewhat similar context, the American people have “practically 
resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”34 
Constitutional law, on such terms, is indeed the anti-democratic and 
authoritarian exercise of judicial power that the Court’s critics have often 
accused it of being. Constitutional law is, furthermore, a conscious fraud on 
the Court’s part, for the justices never claim to make constitutional 
decisions based on their policy preferences but always to do so on the 
authority of the Constitution. Originalism is an elegant response to a 
genuine problem.  
III. 
People who are happy to be labeled “not an originalist” counter the 
originalism proposal with a variety of arguments. I want to note two of 
 
 33. To be sure, as I noted earlier, contemporary originalists disagree with one another 
vigorously, but I am not concerned tonight with those disagreements.  
 34. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
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them briefly. Opponents sometimes argue that originalism is in fact 
impossible to execute because the historical question it asks is 
unanswerable, however that question is fashioned. Talk about “the original 
intent” of the framers is subject to all the objections familiar from debate 
over statutory construction: collective law-making bodies do not have 
intentions in the literal sense, much of the time the texts they produce are 
the product of bargains between legislators with very different objectives, 
and so on, attempts to specify what was agreed on beyond the texts 
themselves lead to debatable hypotheses rather than historical truths, the 
evidence on which people try to base such efforts is unreliable and often 
itself the result of manipulation, and so on. Talk about the intentions of the 
ratifiers runs into all the same difficulties, only amplified since we are now 
talking about a collectivity of collective bodies. Changing the focus from 
intent or purpose to an idea like that of original public meaning only moves 
the point of difficulty: we replace the fiction that the Constitution is the 
creation of a single mind with the fiction of an ideal original reader, a 
sheerly hypothetical figure quite similar to the common law’s reasonable 
man, not least because he can be hypothesized only through the use of 
normative rather than historical presuppositions. 
In practice this criticism is, I think, often rather powerful. It can be very 
difficult to make responsible historical arguments about what the language 
of a given provision meant to its first readers, and at least as difficult to talk 
sensibly about the historical purposes of a document that came into 
existence and then into law only by the actions of many different people. 
We need not pause over the sort of faux originalism that mixes two parts 
quotes from Madison’s notes with one part confident generalization and 
“voila! the original meaning.” The difficulty of execution exists even when 
the effort is made by intelligent and skillful scholars. When I read sustained 
arguments on specific issues by the current generation of smart and 
industrious young originalists, I am often struck by how much hard work 
has gone into showing that such and such a meaning was a plausible 
reading of the Constitution . . . and equally struck by the failure to give me 
any real reason to think that this reading was necessarily or even probably 
the one that in fact most people (most readers? most ratifiers? whatever!) 
gave it. Perhaps the most striking recent example of the practical difficulties 
with originalist argument I know can be seen in the opinions Justices Scalia 
and Stevens filed in the Heller Second Amendment case.35 It is no criticism 
of either justice to observe that the historical research on which each relied 
was in all likelihood that of the many brief-writers in the case (and of their 
sources)—that is, after all, what briefs are for.36 As many of you know, the 
 
 35. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 36. See, e.g., Brief for Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) (discussing original meaning); Brief 
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opinions are full of interesting information about early thinking on the right 
to bear arms, and are at loggerheads over what to make of it.37 The fair-
minded response to the justices’ efforts, I think, is that each has shown that 
his normative position on the Second Amendment was entertained by some 
people in the founding era, an historical conclusion that is, of course, utterly 
inconclusive on the only issue that most of us care about—what the Second 
Amendment means. 
Originalism is, oftentimes at least, hard to do well, but unlike some of 
the “I’m not an originalist” crowd I don’t think that refutes the originalist 
proposal. I agree with Judge Richard A. Posner (not an invariable 
experience on my part) that a blanket rejection of all concepts of collective 
intention is untenable: “It denies the possibility of meaningful interpersonal 
communication and agreement, of a ‘meeting of the minds’ . . . to suggest 
that one can never meaningfully ask what Congress was driving at in this or 
that . . . provision . . . is to deny that people can ever share a purpose.”38 The 
possibility of discerning such purposes at least some of the time is not in 
principle different when the shared purpose is that of the Constitution’s 
makers. Heller, the Second Amendment decision, is not really evidence to 
the contrary. It happens to be the case that founding-era Americans 
apparently held a variety of ideas about the right to bear arms and (if I am 
correct) that it is very hard persuasively to single out one of those ideas as 
the public, shared, intended meaning of the Second Amendment (you 
choose the adjective). But this inconclusiveness is by no means true across 
the board, and there is no reason why original-meaning arguments cannot 
be given the priority originalism calls for when they exist just because they 
sometimes do not. When the evidence permits, historically persuasive 
original-meaning claims can be made.39 There is no fault intrinsic to the 
originalists’ history-based method of constitutional interpretation that 
renders the originalist proposal unworkable.  
I can present the second anti-originalist objection more briefly. Even if 
 
for Academics for the Second Amendment as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) (discussing original meaning). 
 37. Compare Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2790–2812 (opinion of the Court) with Heller, 128 S. Ct. 
at 2824–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (debating history). 
 38. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 194–95 (2008). 
 39. An example: I think it is demonstrable (in the probabilistic sense that an assertion of 
intellectual history can be demonstrable) that the commonly understood original meaning of the 
First Amendment forbade prior restraints: history produces a core of meaning that originalism 
would treat as presumptively prior to other modalities such as stare decisis that lead to a more 
lenient approach to prior restraints. See DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 222 (2009). But 
let me make my point in general terms: I do not think that historical arguments, including 
arguments about the original meaning of the Constitution, are impossible efforts to square some 
intellectual circle, or exercises in mere choice dressed up in historical garb. History is not an 
inscrutable mystery, or a mirror in which all that we can see is a reflection of ourselves.  
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it is in theory possible to answer original-meaning questions some of the 
time, the anti-originalist asserts, the resort to history will not save one from 
the problem of interpretive manipulation that spurred the originalist 
proposal in the first place. Original-meaning arguments can be made 
deceitfully or insincerely; more interestingly, they can be made with the 
greatest sincerity and yet reflect the dominating influence of other, non-
historical concerns at work on the originalist’s judgment at a level below 
his or her conscious awareness. Is anyone very surprised that Justice Scalia 
read the historical evidence in Heller one way and Justice Stevens the 
other? 
I think the proper originalist response to this objection, one that I share 
up to a point, is “so what?” Of course it is quite possible to make historical 
arguments hypocritically or manipulatively, or to do so sincerely but 
without noticing the warp in one’s reasoning that stems from bias or 
preference. That is a statement about the human condition, by no means 
confined to history or law. No approach to constitutional law can avoid the 
possibility of human waywardness, any more than a specification of the 
scientific method can stop a dishonest investigator from fudging his results 
or a careless one from seeing what she wants to see. We talk about the 
scientific method in order to give the honest scientist an idea of how to do 
his work; discussions of legal method, including the originalist proposal, 
can only hope to do the same for the honest lawyer, not the cheat. 
At this point, you might well ask why someone who thinks as I do 
should not be an originalist. I agree with the originalists that the problem 
with which they are concerned is an important one. I admire the clarity of 
their proposed solution and I think it could be carried out. I do not subscribe 
to many of the standard objections to originalism. I am not, in short, “not an 
originalist.” But I am not an originalist either. 
IV. 
I am not an originalist because I am a constitutional conservative, and 
the originalists are constitutional radicals. I should acknowledge at this 
point that to identify a proposal as revolutionary is not thereby to prove it 
unwise or unnecessary. Originalists are radicals, but they became such in 
reaction to what they have seen as an intolerable situation: rule by the 
institutional guardians of an authority that those guardians have deliberately 
twisted to suit their own ends through “interpretation.” Their solution is 
simply to insist that this authority be interpreted faithfully (as they see it) in 
the happy confidence that doing so will address the difficulties that 
interpretive obfuscation has created. All that they ask is a return to 
interpretive fidelity, in that respect very much like the Protestant Reformers 
of the sixteenth century. (As an aside, I cannot resist noting that our 
originalists remind me a great deal of Luther, a comparison that in these 
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ecumenical days I am confident you will not take to be a slur. Luther’s 
opponents, needless to say, had little doubt that he was leading a revolution, 
not moderating an academic debate over recent developments in Pauline 
studies.) 
Originalism is a proposal for revolutionary change, for an almost 
wholesale reformation of constitutional law. This aspect of originalism is 
often overlooked, not least by originalism’s proponents. Like most 
revolutionaries, originalists often fancy themselves the restorers of a golden 
past. It is a congenial thought, and found in many settings: though it is 
seldom remarked today, for example, many of the American 
Revolutionaries enjoyed rather absurd stories about Saxon freedom and the 
Norman yoke, as if the Battle of Hastings had been a first and unsuccessful 
attempt to stage the Siege of Yorktown. Radicals of all sorts, under attack 
because of the novelty of their ideas, are fond of pointing out that the word 
radical comes from the Latin for root.40 This rather begs the question 
whether a given radicalism is seeking to return to something’s roots or put 
an axe to them, but with respect to originalism the assumption is clearly the 
former. It is easy to assume furthermore, that a proposal to enshrine original 
meaning must have been originally meant. Easy perhaps, but not true, as I 
have already pointed out. The heyday of historically-serious original 
meaning arguments has been the present, not the founding era. In actual 
fact, there never was a time in our constitutional past in which originalism 
in the modern sense, indeed in any substantive sense, has enjoyed a 
generally-accepted primacy among American constitutionalists. Claims to 
the contrary are an indulgence in the imagination. 
Originalism is a thoroughly modern phenomenon and its triumph would 
mark a sharp break with the legal past. If present-day originalists succeeded 
in persuading the rest of us, the forms in which we make constitutional 
arguments would be severely curtailed. Post-Originalist-Revolution 
constitutional discussion would no longer resemble very closely at all the 
historical tradition of constitutional argument that one finds in Jefferson’s 
and Hamilton’s bank opinions, or Chief Justice John Marshall’s judgments, 
or for that matter in Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s. Recall the three 
historical assertions I laid out a while ago. In our constitutional tradition as 
it has existed up to now, historically-serious original-meaning arguments 
have been only one among a much broader set of modalities of 
interpretation. When Jefferson invoked the drafting history of the 
Constitution in his 1791 opinion, it was as secondary support for a 
conclusion he had already established to his satisfaction on other grounds; 
both he and Hamilton spent far more of their energy debating structural, 
 
 40. Radical is derived from radix (“root”). See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com. 
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prudential, and textual matters. Many of the Supreme Court’s greatest 
decisions have given no serious, sustained attention to original meaning at 
all: think of Marbury, M’Culloch, Strauder, Darby, Barnette, Brown, 
Reynolds v. Sims, New York Times v. Sullivan. In none of these cases (or 
myriad others) did the justices find it necessary to make originalist 
arguments or impossible to reach a decision without doing so. All of these 
decisions would have to be deemed terribly wrong-headed (at least in their 
reasoning), and certainly should not be repeated, if originalism prevails. 
A constitutional law reshaped in accordance with originalism would 
change, not just on specific issues (that would vary), but even more 
fundamentally as an activity or practice. The traditional lawyers’ tools—
close textual reading, argument by analogy from case to case, the principled 
elaboration and application of established rules, consideration of 
consequences—have always made up the essential means by which lawyers 
and judges have interpreted the Constitution. However, they would fade 
into, at best, a quiet insignificance, rather as the old canons of documentary 
construction have sunk into decrepitude without quite disappearing 
altogether. The skills necessary to make good constitutional-law arguments 
would change drastically, with ramifications throughout our legal world. 
Graduate work in history, not the study of legal method, would be the best 
academic background for constitutional-law work, and it might even be 
appropriate to ask the American Historical Association, not the ABA, to 
rate the qualifications of Supreme Court nominees. (But let us not get into 
the nomination process mess!) What has been up to now a rich, variegated, 
disorderly tradition of controversy embedded within a broader legal culture 
characterized by the same complexities would give way to a quite different 
practice of historical argument, supplemented by whatever degree of stare 
decisis the now-originalist judiciary thought unavoidable. It is nothing more 
than accurate to term such a transformation a revolution, and its proponents 
the radicals of our profession—if indeed I should even speak of “our” 
profession. 
Originalism triumphant would open an all but unbridgeable chasm 
between constitutional decision making and the rest of legal practice. A few 
moments ago I mentioned, whimsically, the idea of having professional 
historians evaluate potential justices for an originalist Court, but I am not 
sure it should be a joke. The intellectual knowledge and skills necessary to 
engage in the sort of historical argument that serious originalists call for are 
not at all the same as those of a good lawyer: indeed to some considerable 
extent, the two practices are at cross-purposes. Very few people likely to 
become judges have the training to do originalist work well and the 
adversarial process is not structured to provide courts with historical 
analysis that can be taken seriously—the mocking epithet “law office 
history” is not a joke. No originalist I know of proposes to make the 
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institutional changes necessary to address these problems. But in the 
absence of such changes, what we would end up with, I think, are 
constitutional arguments no more seriously historical than was the norm 
before, but now largely insulated from lawyerly critique by their claims to 
rest on historical “fact.” As I implied earlier, it is by no means clear that the 
opinions in the recent Second Amendment decision are any more 
persuasive because of their elaborate parades of historical, or is it pseudo-
historical, learning. 
Originalism’s own origins lay in tough-minded lawyers reading the 
Supreme Court’s work product and saying “this will not do, not as law”; in 
an originalist world, ironically, lawyers could do little to help identify any 
problems with the Court’s decisions. Under our traditional practices, the 
continuity between the methods of constitutional law and legal method 
generally made every village barrister a potentially effective critic as well 
as advocate: the Supreme Court’s centrality in constitutional argument 
stemmed from its institutional role, not the esoteric nature of its reasoning. 
Originalism would substantially modify this healthy vulnerability on the 
Court’s part to professional cross-examination, rendering constitutional law 
less open to broad-based criticism, and making it more the preserve of 
supposed experts.  
At the same time, by downgrading or dismissing the relevance to 
constitutional decision of the traditional lawyerly skills, originalism would 
forfeit the profound and (I believe) beneficial contribution of the lawyerly 
mindset to the resolution of constitutional disputes. In the work of good 
lawyers, legal method is the practice of “coming to a responsible decision, 
what to do, what to advise, what to order,” rather than an academic 
exercise.41 For many observers, and I am one, the best justices have been 
those who approached the task of constitutional interpretation as just this—
one of the occasions on which it is necessary to undertake the ordinary 
lawyer’s task of responsible decision. Treating a constitutional decision in 
this way entails no lack of awareness of the decision’s moral and political 
dimensions, but it respects the role of constitutional law in creating and 
maintaining a political community in which disagreement and conflict are 
unavoidable. One of the greatest antebellum American judges, William 
Gaston, once wrote that “[c]onstitutions are not themes proposed for 
ingenious speculation, but fundamental laws ordained for practical 
purposes.”42 Originalism asks us to reverse Gaston’s wise admonition.  
I am an academic, and I love and respect the academic enterprise, but 
the originalists’ proposal would render constitutional law “academic” in the 
 
 41. Joseph Vining, Theorists’ Belief: A Comment on the Moral Tradition of American 
Constitutionalism, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 15, 23 (1996). 
 42. State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 144 (1838). 
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pejorative sense of that term. The Supreme Court is not a history seminar, 
and constitutional decisions affect people’s lives and fortunes, not just 
scholarly reputations. The historian qua historian is oriented, and properly 
so, toward understanding, toward making sense of whatever he is studying: 
the disputes he resolves are ones of understanding, even if he or others take 
his conclusions as the basis for further moral or political judgments. The 
judge deciding a constitutional case is oriented, and necessarily so, toward 
decision, toward announcing an appropriate resolution of some controversy 
in the world of action, not ideas: the disputes she resolves are ones of 
justice and social peace, even if in doing so she also settles some 
intellectual disagreements as well. However much these two activities 
sometimes overlap, they are fundamentally different. Originalism obscures 
or mistakes the difference. If we took originalism seriously as a program for 
constitutional law in general, we would repeat the very mistake to which the 
first originalists objected. That objection, after all, was not that the justices 
were acting out of sheer caprice, as if they were flipping a coin, but that the 
justices were not being candid about their grounds for decision because 
their decisions were not based in responsible legal judgment. The originalist 
cure, in the end, would just as surely eliminate responsible legal judgment, 
even if it would do so in the name of an academic theory honestly avowed.  
V. 
No to originalism, then! But to what shall we say yes? My answer, you 
may already have guessed, is that we should embrace the actual, historical, 
original tradition of American constitutional interpretation. I am not an 
originalist because I am committed to what in fact we have been doing in 
the way of constitutional decision making for the last couple of centuries 
plus. George Washington hardly had drawn his hand off the Bible from 
taking the oath of office when the lawyers seized control of the Constitution 
and made it for most practical purposes their preserve. King James I could 
have warned President Washington about the consequences of giving the 
Constitution into the hands of the lawyers: having done so the American 
Republic engaged itself to run the risk that willful, unscrupulous justices, or 
willful and feckless ones, might make of the Constitution whatever they 
would, “shipmens hose.” Washington was no blind admirer of the 
pretensions of lawyers about the reading of documents: his own last will 
and testament carefully provided that if there should be any dispute over its 
meaning, the controversy was to be resolved by “three impartial and 
intelligent men, known for their probity and good understanding” who were 
to resolve the dispute “unfettered by law or legal constructions.”43 But when 
 
 43. George Washington, Last Will and Testament (July 9, 1799), in 4 ANNALS OF AMERICA 
115, 119 (1968).  
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it came to the Constitution, and questions over its meaning, Washington 
took another approach altogether: he went to the smartest lawyers he knew 
confidentially, and canvassed their professional opinions.44 He knew, or 
quickly learned, that he could not expect them always to agree—recall, yet 
once again, Jefferson’s and Hamilton’s bank opinions written for 
Washington who had to decide whether to approve the national bank act or 
veto it. The legal interpretation of the Constitution is a matter of judgment, 
not geometry, and as in any practice involving human judgment, smart and 
good people sometimes disagree, obtuse ones often make no sense, and 
dishonest ones can offer inauthentic decisions concealed by dead, dishonest 
speech.  
Washington may not have trusted “legal constructions,” but he 
understood the problems surrounding human judgment in his bones, and he 
turned to the lawyers and legal reasoning for solutions to constitutional 
questions. In doing so, Washington was vindicated. If the Constitution is 
actually to be, as it calls itself, the supreme law of the land, Americans have 
recognized that there will inevitably be disputes over its meaning and 
application, and from the beginning we have addressed that reality using the 
resources of the law. Without much ado, and from the beginning, we 
therefore have subsumed constitutional interpretation under the familiar 
legal activity of interpreting documents that possess, for some purpose or 
the other, authority: statutes, wills, trust instruments, charters, and the like. 
Constitutional interpretation became constitutional law, created in the 
image and with the tools of the common law.45  
The results have been pretty much what one would expect. The lawyers 
have done what common lawyers do, and the chief result of their labors has 
been the creation of a vast body of judge-made case law, in its form and 
character a species of common law even though it is case law anchored to 
the text of the Constitution. What Justice Stevens once wrote about the law 
of the First Amendment is true of constitutional law generally: it is “an 
elaborate mosaic of specific judicial decisions, characteristic of the common 
law process of case-by-case adjudication.”46 The common-law method does 
not pretend to the certainty of deductive logic: as Stevens also observed, the 
 
 44. See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 11 (1992) (discussing Washington’s consultations 
with a broad range of lawyers). 
 45. This assertion, I believe, should not be controversial as a matter of historical description. 
See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 66 (1991) (“Originalism was not the original 
interpretive doctrine of the framers nor of the framing generation. It was taken for granted that the 
Constitution, like other legal texts, would be interpreted by men who were learned in the law, 
arguing cases and writing judgments in the way lawyers and judges had done for centuries in 
England and its colonies. Argument from precedent and by analogy would allow the Constitution 
to be applied to changing circumstances. . . . This has been the texture of common lawyers’ 
reasoning for centuries.”). 
 46. John P. Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300–01 (1993). 
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“judges have frequently reminded us that their work involves more than the 
logical application of general propositions to particular facts; instead, in the 
crucible of litigation, those facts often reshape the very propositions that 
have been applied to them.”47  
Our constitutional law reflects another aspect of the common law as 
well. From the medieval yearbooks on, the common law has unabashedly 
recognized the impress of individual minds on its process of decision. 
Partly as a consequence, the common law of the Constitution has frequently 
come to specific decisions that were and are contestable in good faith, and 
its history undeniably reflects the personalities, predilections and politics of 
those who have created it. A body of fundamental law made by such means 
will inevitably be contentious and its links to the other political and ethical 
commitments of the lawyers will be unmistakable. With the national-bank 
controversy in mind, John Marshall wrote in 1805 that “[t]he judgment is so 
much influenced by the wishes, the affections, and the general theories of 
those by whom any political proposition is decided, that a contrariety of 
opinion on this [or, we might add, any other] great constitutional question 
ought to excite no surprise.”48 The American constitutional tradition is as 
much one of political conflict as it is of agreement, though it is conflict 
within a shared practice of legal argument. 
In such a legal tradition, a tremendous amount necessarily rests on the 
identities of the constitutionalists themselves. The Constitution and the 
Republic have been served by brilliant lawyers, interpreters who brought 
both intellectual honesty and political vision to the task; and by inept or 
crassly partisan lawyers unable to distinguish their passions from 
responsible judgments; and also, no doubt, by a few scoundrels, cynical 
about the whole enterprise. Their constitutional decisions and opinions—
whether as justices, judges, presidents, members of Congress, executive 
officers, or scholars—have sometimes been as admirable, both in reasoning 
and in moral substance, as one could reasonably hope from any human 
political institution. All too often the decisions have been failures, 
intellectually and morally, as well as constitutionally. As Marshall might 
have said, that too ought to excite no surprise, not in a fallen world.  
The problem with originalism as a program is not that the first 
originalists were wrong to sense something amiss with the constitutional 
law of three decades ago. Their error was to think the problem of the 
Constitution’s wax nose somehow unique or the invention of their own 
time, and to think further that it is possible to escape human waywardness 
and error through finding and following the right theory of interpretation. 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. 4 JOHN MARSHALL, LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 243 (Chelsea House 1983) (1805). 
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“Grand theories . . . map uncertainly onto the difficult terrain of the law,”49 
and no theory can eliminate the possibility of error, caprice or dishonesty: 
after all, inept or manipulative arguments can be made about original 
meaning. All the pathologies anyone has ever seen in our original 
constitutional tradition (in the Seventies or any other time) would assert 
themselves in the remade originalist world, amplified by loss of the 
tradition’s common law concern with particularity, with justice in the 
individual case, and by loss of the traditional recognition that uncertainty 
and disagreement are unavoidable. That would make things far worse. The 
tradition, with all its flaws, is grounded in the practicalities of responsible 
decision; originalism is a scholar’s endeavor. There is no theoretical 
solution to the problem of the Constitution’s wax nose—including, I should 
add hastily, theories about common-law constitutionalism. There is instead 
only the case-by-case attempt to come to the best answer we can, the 
individual by individual effort to be conscientious interpreters insofar as we 
can, the ongoing collective task of criticizing cases and interpreters when 
they (when we) fail to do these things.  
VI. 
I have kept you long enough, but before I close I want to return briefly 
to our friend Alain of Lille. Let me remind again you of the entirety of 
Alain’s famous dictum: “But since authority has a nose made of wax, it is 
possible to twist it in any direction, so that one must rely on strengthening 
the rational faculty.” Another way to render the last clause would be “so 
that one must rely on fortifying [authority] with reasons.”50 The exact 
translation is immaterial for our purposes, however: what interests me is 
Alain’s suggestion that the problem of interpretive uncertainty can be 
ameliorated by resort to the activity of offering and evaluating reasoned 
arguments.  
There is an implied contrast here. Without the fortification of reason, on 
the one hand, an argument resting on authority is an exercise of power, 
power asserted in the authority’s name but power in fact wielded by the 
person making the argument. And power in this sense can indeed be twisted 
in any direction one wishes: it is external, authoritarian, a means of 
intellectual and, maybe, institutional coercion. On the other hand, there are 
arguments grounded in authority but structured and set forth through the 
 
 49. Samuel Issacharoff, The Difficult Path from Observation to Prescription, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 36, 44 (2002). 
 50. See Nicolette Zeeman, The Idol of the Text, in IMAGES, IDOLATRY, AND ICONOCLASM IN 
LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 50 (Jeremy Dimmick, James Simpson, & Nicolette Zeeman eds., 
2002). The question about the correct translation cannot be resolved simply on the basis of 
grammar: ratio could be used in ancient and medieval Latin in either the singular or the plural 
without a change of meaning. See, e.g., Gerald Bray, The Legal Concept of Ratio in Tertullian, 31 
VIGILIAE CHRISTIANAE 94, 97 (1977).  
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exercise of the rational faculty, through the presentation of reasons that 
appeal to the mind and judgment not just of the person making them, but of 
his hearers and readers as well. Such arguments are not authoritarian, for 
they implicitly admit the legitimacy of disagreement, the legitimacy of the 
hearer or reader saying “no, that doesn’t make sense to me.” Alain 
apparently believed that the orthodox Catholicism of his day could and 
should be explicated on the basis of this sort of argument by authority and 
reason, and not through imitating the intellectual bullying he ascribed to his 
“new heretics.” Authority and reason were not opposites but essential allies 
in his mind: reason rightly exercised is the true form of obedience to 
genuine authority.51 
It has been a long time since Alain’s day, and our concern, tonight 
anyway, is with the authority of the Constitution and not that of Scripture or 
the Fathers or Aristotle. The first half, the famous half, of Alain’s statement 
is undeniably relevant. The Constitution has a wax nose: its interpretation 
can be disputed in good faith and manipulated in bad. Is there in 
constitutional law a parallel to the second half, to his resort to reason? 
Historically, the answer was clearly yes. In our constitutional tradition, as 
that very fine and very traditional judge Richard Arnold once wrote, “the 
judicial power . . . is based on reason, not fiat.”52 I would add (on my own 
though I think Judge Arnold would have agreed) that this means reason in a 
robust, almost medieval sense, not an etiolated version of reasoning that 
excludes on a priori grounds most forms of recognized legal argument. We 
have practiced constitutional law as Alain wanted theologians to practice 
Christian theology, by an embrace of reason, not a flight from it. 
Originalism, with its fearful retreat to a single approved line of argument, 
gets this exactly backwards. If the justices, or other constitutionalists, have 
lost their faith in our shared practices of reasoned legal debate, the solution 
is to recall them to their duty, or educate them in it, not to create some new 
definition of their task in the naive hope that they will be more faithful to it 
than to the original. 
If our tradition of reasoned argument is at risk, however, it is not the 
originalists, with their reductionistic view of constitutional law, who are 
chiefly to blame. They at least would tell us what they are doing. I am more 
afraid of those who are happy to maintain the trappings of legal argument 
on the understanding, shared among those in the know, that the real 
 
 51. In an earlier work, Alain asserted that theological truth is established and error refuted 
through reason’s approbation of what is disclosed by nature and revelation. “‘For now the 
nightmares of Epicurus are put to sleep, the insanity of Manichaeus made sane, the quibbles of 
Aristotle argued, the false arguments of the Arians falsified; reason approves the unique unity of 
God, [which] the universe declares, faith believes, and [to which] Scripture testifies’ ([De planctu 
naturae] 8.140–41, 143–45).” SWEENEY, supra note 3, at 163. 
 52. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
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determinants of constitutional decision have nothing to do with the law. 
This is no mere impoverishment of law; it is the negation of law. Put into 
action, it is a betrayal: a judge who thinks legal reasoning is nothing more 
than a rationalization for decisions reached on other grounds, and yet 
announces those decisions in the name of the Constitution, acts in bad faith. 
Such decisions may enjoy raw institutional power but they are lawless, as 
our tradition has understood law. The opinions announcing them make no 
appeal to the mind and judgment of the reader just as they express nothing 
of the mind and judgment of the decision maker. In that emptiness lies the 
death of constitutional law. 
 
